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We develop new techniques to assess the relationship between commercial bank 
performance and the economic conditions in the markets in which they operate.  In the 
analysis, we allow for heterogeneity in the responses of banks to regional economic 
conditions.  We find a statistically significant relationship between bank performance and 
shocks to the regional markets in which they operate.  We find that region-specific 
shocks have a significant and persistent effect on the cross-sectional variance of bank 
performance in the market.  That is, shocks affecting average performance of banks in a 
region also tend to increase the dispersion of their performance.  We demonstrate that this 
effect is due to heterogeneity in the banks’ exposures to their regional economies.  
Moreover, by allowing for this heterogeneity, we find that systematic responses to 
regional economic effects are notably more important in explaining the variation in bank 
performance than suggested by analysis in which responses are constrain to be the same 
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Regional Economic Conditions and the  




Small banks, by virtue of their size and their emphasis on so-called relationship 
banking, tend to have limited geographic scope in their activities. This is especially true 
in connection with lending, with small banks tending to contract with pools of customers 
from limited geographic areas. The performance of a small commercial bank, then, is 
expected to be tied to the financial condition of its customers and, thus, to the economic 
conditions in the local banking market.
1 
Contrary to this expectation, studies testing for a relationship between bank 
performance and regional economic conditions find little evidence of systematic effects 
of economic conditions at the county level. Yeager (2004), for example, finds that 
performance of community banks in counties experiencing large economic shocks 
reflected in county unemployment rates was not much different from that of similar 
banks, but located in other counties. Using a different methodology, Emmons, Gilbert, 
and Yeager (2004) find that rates of return at community banks in the same region were 
not highly correlated in the late 1980s and early 1990s.  Their results indicate that most of 
the potential reduction of diversifiable risk could be achieved though local market 
mergers rather than out-of-market mergers.  They conclude that lack of scale, rather than 
exposure to local economic conditions, accounts for an important share of community 
banks’ exposure to diversifiable risk. 
Studies that examine the influences of state level economic conditions find some 
support for regional economic effects on bank performance. Meyer and Yeager (2001) 
and Daly, Krainer, and Lopez (2007) find statistically significant effects of a variety of 
measures of state economic conditions on measures of bank performance. However, in 
the latter study, the model is not effective in predicting differences in problem loans for 
individual banks in out-sample simulations.   
                                                 
1 Bank performance may also affect regional economic conditions.  See Morgan, Rime, and Strahan (2002) 
for an analysis of how bank performance and integration affect regional economic growth. 
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A feature of most previous approaches is an assumption that the systematic 
responses of bank performance measures to a change in economic conditions are the 
same for all community banks.  However, specialization among community banks could 
lead to variation in business strategies and portfolio composition, which could, in turn, 
lead to variation in the systematic responses of performance to regional economic 
conditions.  Also, most previous studies use measures of regional economic conditions 
such as employment growth or the unemployment rate.  The studies in effect assume that 
the response of bank performance of a given change in the regional metric will be similar 
over time and across markets.  However, it seems likely the responses of performance of 
banks to economic shocks driving a regional a metric could depend on the exact nature of 
the shock. If so, a systematic relationship between the performance of community banks 
and a measure of regional economic shocks may be difficult to detect. 
In this study we present new empirical evidence based on analysis allowing for 
different systematic responses by individual banks to regional economic conditions.  In 
the analysis, the region is the state.  We also utilize measures of economic shocks related 
to aggregate bank performances.  While the measures still do not identify the underlying 
sources of the shocks, they should reflect more reliably the relative magnitude of the 
shocks with respect to banks at different points in time and across regions.  
The findings suggests that accounting for differences in the systematic response 
of individual banks to economic shocks is important for identifying  the link between 
bank performance and regional economic conditions  The responses of individual banks 
vary widely, ranging from significantly positive to significantly negative.  The disparate 
responses of community banks also means that the state shocks tend to increase the cross-
sectional variance in performance among banks in a region.  This latter result is 
additional evidence of regional effects on bank performance.  It also is relevant to most 
studies assessing the average responses to economic shocks since the increase in variance 
would tend to reduce the precision of the estimated coefficients on the metrics for 
regional economic conditions.  The analysis reveals a complicated picture of influences 
of economic conditions on community banks, one in which regional economic conditions 
have been extremely important for a number of community banks, of some influence for 
others, and of limited importance to the rest.       3
The paper is organized as follows.  Section 2 describes the approaches used in 
previous research assessing the relationship of bank performance to regional economic 
conditions. Section 3 develops the framework used in this study for assessing national, 
regional, and bank specific influences on rates of return for banks with identifiable 
geographic markets. The data used in the empirical analysis are described in Section 4. 
The empirical results regarding the effects of national and regional economic effects on 
the performance of community banks are presented in Section 5.  Conclusions are 
presented in section 6. 
 
 
2. Previous approaches to assessing regional economic influences 
 
A common approach in the literature is to identify factors that proxy for overall 
economic conditions and correlate these factors with bank performance.  In this tradition, 
researchers have used variables such as employment growth, unemployment rates, 
income growth, home price appreciation, and indexes based on several variables as 
measures of regional economic conditions.  The scope of the market, or the region, is 
variously defined as the state, the metropolitan area, or the county.  Most studies deal 
with smaller banks with regionally concentrated activities, as one is relatively confident 
about defining the market correctly for this set of institutions. One exception is Daly et al. 
(2007) which uses the geographic distribution of bank deposits to apportion regional 
economic influences for larger, interstate banking organizations. Measures of bank 
performance include rates of return on assets and equity, nonperforming assets, and 
charge offs. Some studies also include bank specific variables that are expected to 
influence bank performance such as loan composition. 
With these variables in hand, the basic approach in most previous studies is to 
assess the effects of regional influences by regressing bank performance on one or more 
measures of regional economic conditions. It is common to include the lagged 
performance variable in the regressions.  Most of these studies seek to measure the 
average effect of economic conditions on performance in a given region.  An important 
assumption underlying this basic approach is that effects of the underlying economic 
factors, such as employment growth or real estate conditions, are similar for banks over   4
time and across regions.  Another important assumption is that banks in the same region 
are similar enough in their exposure to shocks that performance among banks will be 
positively correlated.  
Using this approach, studies focusing on narrower geographic regions such as 
counties tend to find little correlation between measures of economic conditions bank 
performance (Meyer and Yeager (2001) and Yeager 2003). The findings suggest that 
variations in very local economic conditions are not an important source of risk for 
community banks. When state level data are used, studies find some evidence of 
systematic effects of economic conditions on banks (Nealy and Wheelock (1997), Meyer 
and Yeager (2001), and Daly et al. (2007).    
Using a much different framework, Emmons et al. (2004) also argue regional or 
local market risk is not a major source of risk for community banks.  Their study does not 
rely on measures of regional economic conditions such as unemployment.  Rather the 
effects of regional conditions (local market risk) are assessed looking directly at the 
correlation structure of bank return on assets in a given market.  The authors simulate 
hypothetical mergers to assess the potential effects on the reduction in risk among 
community banks, where risk reduction is derived from reducing variance of rates of 
return. The study finds that most of the risk reduction comes from in-market mergers, 
rather than out of market mergers. 
Emmons et al. (2004) conclude that, for community banks, most of the potential 
diversification of risk could be achieved through increasing scale, rather than geographic 
diversification. The implication appears to be that exposure to local economic conditions 
is not a source of exposure to non-systematic (diversifiable) risk for community banks. 
However, in the assessing the effects of mergers on diversification, the study does not 
account for differences in business strategies (portfolio composition) among community 
banks in a region.  Furlong (2004) shows that bank portfolio composition can vary 
considerably among community banks.  Reductions in non-systematic risk in 
hypothetical random mergers of community banks in a region may be due more to 
increased portfolio diversification than to increased scale.  
The previous studies provide valuable insights into relation of regional economic 
condition and average bank performance.  For example, previous research suggests that,   5
from a bank supervisory perspective, information about regional economic conditions 
may not provide useful forecasts of the likely performance of an individual bank. 
However, with a focus on the common or average effect of economic conditions on bank 
performance, the studies may understate the degree to which regional economic 
conditions affect the variability of the performance of individual banks because those 
banks have different systematic responses to region-wide shocks.  Indeed, competition 
between banks may encourage them to specialize and find product niches (see Cohen and 
Mazzeo (2004)).  This strategy would tend to loosen the correlation of performance 
across banks in a market in response to a particular kind of shock.  To extent that this is 
the case, evidence on the common or average effects of regional economic conditions 
may not be a reliable guide to assessing the risk associated with limited geographic scope 
for the purposes of a assessing, say, appropriate, levels of regulatory capital.  
 
 
III. An alternative approach to modeling rates of return for banks   
 
The approach we take in assessing regional economic effects is to examine their 
impact on the variability of bank performance when allowing for the responses of 
individual banks to economic conditions, both nationally and regionally, to vary. We 
focus on rates of return (returns on assets and equity) as the measures bank performance. 
Under this approach we capture the effects of national and regional factors affecting the 
average bank performance by using measures of aggregate national and regional rates of 
return. The impact of regional shocks is assessed in two ways.  The first is the degree to 
which individual bank performance is affected by the region-specific influences over 
time.  Second, we measure the impact of regional shocks on the distribution of bank 
performance in the relevant region. 
 To develop the approach used in this paper, we start by noting that the 
performance of the average bank located in state j can be apportioned between systematic 
(aggregate) banking sector risk and idiosyncratic state-specific risk.   
 
(1)      . jt j Bt jt RR γ ε = +  
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The systematic portion of performance,  jB t R γ , owes itself to the fact that all banks are in 
the same basic business, and therefore share exposure to the same basic set of shocks to 
variables like interest rates and aggregate economic growth.  This exposure is governed 
by  j γ .  The term  jt ε  represents the idiosyncratic component of state j’s banking 
performance   The degree of idiosyncratic risk observed in the returns of banks in a 
specific state can be thought of as arising from the fact that not all state economies have 
the same industry mix, demographics, and contemporaneous rates of economic growth.  
A large, diversified state economy such as California may behave very similarly to the 
national economy as a whole.  For smaller, less-diversified economies such as Alaska, 
state economic growth may look very different from the aggregate, and these differences 
would likely appear in the state-specific component of Alaska’s banking sector 
performance.  
Using the same logic as above, we model the performance of an individual bank i 
operating in state j as 
 
(2)     . ijt i jt it RR θ η =+  
 
The sensitivity to aggregate and state-specific factors affects individual bank i’s 
performance through  jt R  and through its exposure to those risks,  i θ .  As before, the 
idiosyncratic term,  it η , reflects the fact that individual banks are likely to have firm-
specific components in their performance measures due to their unique circumstances, 
business strategy, and customers. 
Combining (1) and (2) yields, 
 
(3)     . ijt i Bt i jt it RR β θε η =+ +  
 
Equation (3) is a starting point for empirical analysis.  The coefficient  i β  represents the 
sensitivity of an individual bank’s rate of return to the aggregate, national rate of return 
(for community banks).  Note that the sensitivity of bank i to aggregate shocks is given   7
by,  ii j β θγ = .  In other words, individual bank sensitivities reflect the average sensitivity 
to aggregate factors in that state, scaled by that bank’s sensitivity to state factors.  The 
term  jt ε  represents the regional conditions and their effect on banks, and  i θ  measures the 
sensitivity of individual bank performance to regional conditions.  The coefficients  i θ  
vary by bank, reflecting the potential for banks to differ according to their sensitivities to 
shocks of different kinds.  Community banks tend to have business strategies directed at 
serving particular types of customers and providing certain types of services.  Indeed, the 
limited size of a community bank may dictate a choice of specialization over 
diversification. As a result, in a given region, concentrations of consumer loans, business 
loans, and real estate loans can vary considerably among community banks.  Note that by 
allowing for differences in responses to the national and regional conditions, some of 
what might be considered bank-specific effects related to say, portfolio differences, are 
accounted for through the coefficients  i β  and  i θ  in equation (3).  Finally, the term  it η can 
be thought of as capturing the effects of other bank-specific factors.  For example, banks 
will be exposed to the shocks that affect their individual customers, and these shocks may 
not be directly related to the national or the local economy.  With limited scale, small 
banks will not be able to diversify away these risks, even though in expectation their 
effect is zero.  Also, differences in management quality would affect individual bank 
performance given economic conditions and portfolio mix. 
 
 
IV. The data  
 
The empirical analysis is based on a panel data set of small commercial banks. 
The data used in the empirical analysis are from the Reports of Condition (Call Reports) 
filed by all domestically chartered banks in the U.S.  Because we are interested in 
assigning banks to a geographic region, we restrict our attention to small banks with 
assets less than $1 billion. 
In tables 1a and 1b we report the number of small banks with usable Call Report 
data in our sample period.  Not surprisingly, large states tend to have more small banks, 
on average.  But also evident in table 1a is the legacy of the unit banking states such as   8
Illinois and Texas, which tend to have far more small banks than similarly sized states 
(e.g., California).  In the first quarter of 1984 there were 13,849 small banks (table 1b).  
By the fourth quarter of 2004 this number fell by 50 percent to 6,954. While most states 
experienced significant declines in the number of banks (the average decline over this 
period was 45%), the Northeast experienced the biggest relative declines.  Massachusetts 
lost 82% of its small banks during this 20-year period.  New Hampshire lost 83% of its 
small banks.  The western states experienced less decline (or consolidation) in banking 
than average.  Nevada experienced a doubling of the number of small banks 
headquartered there over this time period. 
The aggregate U.S. bank rates of return are based on the performance of all 
community banks (assets less $1 billion) with useable Call Report data in a quarter.  The 
U.S. small bank performance over the sample period mirrors the same patterns observed 
in the industry as a whole. Average return on assets (ROA) and return on equity (ROE) 
over the 25-year period were 0.8% and 9%, respectively.  In figures 1a and 1b we see a 
fair amount of volatility in the aggregate (small bank) performance measures.  Both 
measures recount the recent history in the banking sector, where bank financial condition 
suffered in the late 1980s during the banking crisis, but then recovered and has remained 
strong ever since.  Note that the time-series of ROA and ROE associated with banks in 
the 25
th percentile are more volatile than the series for better-performing banks in the 
distribution.  Evidently, a smooth series such as aggregate ROA masks a fair degree of 
heterogeneity in the cross-sectional distribution. 
The aggregate regional data for bank rates of return are measured at the state level 
and, again, represent the weighted-average rates of returns for all small banks with 
useable Call Report data in the corresponding state in a given quarter. We focus on state 
level for this study because previous studies find some support for state economic effects 
on bank performance. By using states for the relevant regions, we can illustrate that even 
those findings of some systematic effects of regional economic tend to understate the 
impact of regional conditions on the variability of bank earnings. 
 
 
   9
V. Empirical finding regarding commercial bank exposures to national 
and regional shocks 
 
The first stage of the empirical analysis examines the sensitivities of regional 
performance to national factors.  This exercise yields the state shocks which are then fed 
into the individual bank regressions of performance on both national and region-specific 
factors.  Estimates of the relationships between state-level performances and aggregate 
performance are based on the full sample (described in the previous section).  The 
individual bank regressions (equation (3) and its variants) are based on a balanced panel 
subset of the larger data set.  The balanced panel contains observations on 5,255 different 
entities with continuous histories over the sample period.  In these regressions we 
required each state to have at least 10 observations.  The measures of bank performance 
are quarterly rates of return on assets (ROA) and rates of return on book-value equity 
(ROE).  The data series for the aggregate rates of return and for individual banking 
organizations used for the balanced panel are seasonally adjusted. 
 
Estimates of region-specific conditions 
To derive the quarterly observation for the portion of the state level rates of return 
associated regional conditions, we estimate equation 3 (with a constant term) separately 
for each state.  The results from state-by-state regressions are reported in tables 2a and 
2b.  The number of observations in each quarter varies among the states and over time.  
The time-series variation reflects both cyclical factors (entry and exit) as well as a 
declining trend in the number of banks due to consolidation.   
The mean sensitivity of state ROA to aggregate (U.S.) ROA is 1.1 (1.2 for the 
case of ROE in table 2b).
2  About four-fifths of the coefficients on aggregate ROA and 
ROE are significantly different from zero.  Most, although not all, of the estimates are 
positive.  Still there is a fair degree of dispersion in the estimates of state sensitivity to 
aggregate U.S. banking performance.  For ROA, the 25
th percentile and the 75
th percentile 
of the distribution of estimates are 0.43 and 1.45, respectively.  For ROE, the 25
th 
                                                 
2 This average value for γ across states contrasts with the weighted average γ (by assets), which must sum 
to one by construction. 
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percentile and the 75
th percentile of the distribution of estimates are 0.27 and 1.29, 
respectively.  In general, the fit for the ROA regressions is better.  The adjusted-R
2s
 for 
the ROA regressions range from less than 1 percent (e.g., Rhode Island) to 90 percent 
(Colorado), with a median of about 50 percent, while the figures for the ROE regressions 
are less than 1 percent (Michigan) to 80 percent (Colorado), with a median of 18 percent. 
The region-specific conditions (effects) for the states are the residuals from each 
of the regressions reported in tables 2a and 2b.  Examples of the time series for the 
region-specific components of ROA and ROE are shown in figures 2a and 2b for three 
states—California, Oregon, and Arizona.  The figures indicate that even for states in 
relatively close proximity, regional effects can differ substantially at any point in time.  
The pair-wise correlations for the state-specific components εjt in these three states never 
exceed 0.2.
3   
The state-specific conditions for these and other states tend to be serially 
correlated.  This is not too surprising given the findings in previous studies that indicate 
significant serial correlation in the performance of individual banks.  Studies such as 
Meyer and Yeager (2001) and Daly et al. (2007) find lagged performance measures are 
highly significant in regression of bank performance on regional conditions.
4  The 
presence of serial correlation in the estimated εj’s does raise the question of how reliable 
our standard errors are for the relevant coefficients. 
 
 Individual bank exposure to regional condition 
The impact of economic conditions on the performance of community banks is 
assessed using the framework from equation (3) for each of the panel banks.  Note that 
the estimation allows for variation in the responses of individual community banks to 
national influences and to region-specific effects.  The analysis in this section is based on 
                                                 
3 These low correlations at the state level point to the potential for diversification through inter-state 
banking. 
 
4 Previous studies generally have not used the estimates of the lagged adjustment to assess the long-run 
effects of regional conditions. 
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a balanced panel of banks.  We also only include the states for which the number of 
observations available to estimate the state shocks was 10 or more in every quarter.
5 
As noted above, the state-specific shocks are serially correlated.  A possible 
approach, then, would be to address the serial correlation of the state-specific effects in 
estimating equation (1).  Since our main interest is in the second-stage regressions and 
the coefficients on the state shocks and the remaining residual term, it may be 
inappropriate to purge the state shocks of serial correlation.  It is entirely plausible that 
region-specific shocks have persistent effects on the banking sector.
6 We would, 
however, like the residuals in the second stage regression to be white noise.  Thus, we 
modify equation (3) as follows, 
 
(4)   1, 2, 1 3, 2 4, , 3 . ijt i Bt i jt i jt i jt i j t it RR β θε θε θε θε η −− − =++ + + +   
 
The results from the estimation of equation (4) (with a constant term) relating to 
the distribution of the values of  i β  (the sensitivity to national condition) are shown in 
solid lines in figures 3a and 3b. As with the responses to the state levels of rates of return, 
the coefficients for community banks vary considerably.  Overall, the coefficients tend to 
be positive; with about 70 percent of the sum of coefficients being positive for the ROA 
equations.  The 25
th percentile and the 75
th percentile of the distribution of estimates are   
-0.2 and 1.3, respectively, with a median value of about 0.6 for the ROA equations (mean 
value of about .8).  For ROE, the median and mean values for the coefficient on the 
national factor are about 0.6 and 1.1, respectively.
7  A statistical test strongly supports the 
hypotheses that the means of the coefficients for U.S. ROA and ROE are not equal to 
zero.    
The key parameters of interest in the model are the i θ , which measure the 
sensitivity of bank i’s performance to economic conditions specific to the state.  We 
                                                 
5 This criterion eliminated Alaska, the District of Columbia, Hawaii, and Rhode Island. 
6 Berger et. al. (2000) document the persistence of bank performance. 
 
7 Yeager (2003) points out that that convergence of regional economies over time could affect the 
importance of regional effects on bank performance.  At the state level, economies have tended to become 
more diversified.   12
report statistics from the distribution of the sums of  i θ  in dashed lines in figures 3a and 
3b.  From the figures, the median values of the sums of  i θ  for the ROE and ROA 
regressions are approximately 0.5 (the mean values are about 0.6 and 0.7, respectively).   
The statistical tests strongly support the hypotheses that the means of the coefficients for 
the state components of ROA and ROE are not equal to zero.  Moreover, while we can 
not reject the hypotheses that the estimates are from a distributions with means greater 
than zero, the coefficient on the state components of ROA and ROE are negative and 
statistically significant for a minority of banks in the panel.  Among the results from the 
individual bank regressions for ROA, about 40% of the sums of the coefficients on the 
state shocks are positive and significantly different from zero and another 10% are 
negative and statistically significant.  The results for the ROE regressions are 42% 
positive and 12% negative and significant.  
 The results from statistical analysis also highlight the considerable variation in 
the systematic responses of the performance of individual banks to factors affecting 
banks nationally and in their respective states. The variation in the response to state-
specific conditions also is somewhat larger than that for the responses to national 
conditions. For example, the inter-quartile range for the distribution of  i β  is 1.26 for 
ROA, compared to 1.5 for the sum of  i θ  coefficients.  It is also worth noting that the 
variation in the sums of  i θ  is present not only among banks in different states, but also 
among banks in the same state.  
  The interpretation of the results is that state shocks can have a potentially large 
effect on individual bank performance.  The size of this effect depends not only on the 
size of the shock, but also on the varying degree to which banks are positioned to be 
affected by the shock. Banks with large θ’s have apparently selected strategies that, at 
least ex-post, made them more vulnerable to shocks typical in their regional (in this case 
state) markets.  The wide variation in even the systematic responses of community banks 
to state shocks may be part of the reason that previous research has found regional 
economic conditions do little to improve out-of-sample forecasts of bank performance.  
Moreover, it also is possible that the range of systematic responses, significantly negative 
to significantly positive, found using state level data may also be indicative of community   13
bank exposures at narrower geographic aggregations, such as counties and may mask the 
role of regional shocks when assessed by the average impact.  
 
Regional shocks and the cross-sectional distribution of community bank performance 
The variation in systematic response to state-specific (as well as national) 
economic conditions (i.e., shocks to those conditions) suggests that the effect of state-
specific conditions should be assessed not just on the average effect on community bank 
performance, but also on the distribution of bank performance.  The next steps in the 
empirical analysis are to assess the effect of state shocks on the variance of return for the 
individual community banks and the effects of state shocks to the distribution of rates of 
return in a given state 
In examining the effects on the cross-sectional distributions of rates of returns 
among banks in the same state, we include ROA and ROE for all community banks with 
useable Call Reports in a given state and quarter.  The approach is to examine how the 
value of a regional shock at a point in time affects the distribution of bank performance.  
The idea is that, if banks are affected differentially by regional shocks, then regional 
shocks should increase the dispersion of performance. 
For this analysis, then, we compute the variance of the distribution of ROA and 
ROE for each state for each quarter over the sample period.  The magnitude of regional 
shocks is measured in two ways—the absolute value of shock,  jt ε ,  and the square of the 
shocks, ()
2
jt ε .  The observations then are quarterly for each state.  For each state, we first 
use pooled-cross sectional regressions where the dependent variable is variance of the 
rates of return (ROA or ROE) of all banks in a state at time t and the explanatory variable 
is either the absolute value of the regional shock (or the square of the shock) at time t.  
We use pooled cross-section regressions for all the states with state-fixed effects. 
The results for the regressions are shown in tables 3a and 3b.  In the pooled cross-
section the measures of the dispersion of bank performances are positively and 
significantly related to both metrics of the state-level shocks.  As indicated, the 
regressions were estimated with and without controlling for state-specific and time period   14
(quarterly) effects.
8  The main result in this section is that the effects of the shocks on the 
variances of performance are positively correlated with variation in the sums of the 
coefficients i θ .  This indicates that the effects of regional shock to banking are manifested 
in the distribution of bank performance within a state.  To the extent that regional shocks 
tend to increase the variance of performance of banks in a region, this would tend to 
make it more difficult to reject the hypothesis that regional shocks do not affect bank 
performance when the test is on the effects on the level of ROA or ROE of banks. 
Evidently, regional economic conditions have a statistically significant effect on the 
variance of bank performance in a given market, even while the effect of economic 
conditions on average performance might be muted.   
We continue the analysis by exploring the dynamic relationship between regional 
shocks and the distribution of bank performance.  Towards this end, the basic relationship 
between shocks to a banking market and their effect on the distribution of performance in 
that market can be summarized using a vector autoregression (VAR).  In this exercise we 
estimate a pooled VAR, 
 
(6)     01 1223344 , jt jt jt jt jt jt Y YYYY φ φφ φφν −−−− = + ++++  
 
where Yjt is a two-dimensional vector containing the variance of ROA (or ROE) in a 
given state j at time t and a measure of the state shock at time t: alternatively,  jt ε  or 
()
2
jt ε  for each state j.  The 2x1 vector υt is a white noise process uncorrelated with Yt.  
The pooling refers to pooling across states, so that the coefficients in equation (6) should 
be interpreted as average effects.  To avoid problems associated with survivorship bias, 
the results presented below are based on the full sample (i.e., not the balanced panel).
9 
                                                 
8 Binary (zero-one) dummies variables were included to control for time invariant factors for the states and 
state invariant factors for each quarter.  In the tables, the robust standard errors are reported in parenthesis. 
9 We conducted the same exercise for the balanced panel and found the same qualitative results.  However, 
the magnitude of the relationship between the variance of state-level rates of return and the state shock was 
smaller, as the survivor firms in the balanced panel exhibit less volatility over the sample period. 
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  Figures 4a and 4b plot a two standard deviation shock to  jt ε  for both ROA and 
ROE.  In 4a, note that even a two standard deviation shock is quite small.  This reflects 
the fact that ROA in general is both small and not that variable in the banking data.  The 
figure shows, however, that the average effect of changes in the state shock has a 
significant effect on the cross sectional variance of ROA in the state.  The effect is 
significant immediately at the one quarter lag, and is persistent and positive out to 12 
quarters.  The same basic patterns are even more evident in figure 4b, where we plot the 
impulse response of the variance of ROE to a shock to  jt ε .  Indeed, the magnitude of the 
effect is much larger for the more volatile ROE.  A one standard deviation shock to  jt ε  
initially moves the average variance of state ROE by about 2 percentage points.  To put 
this into perspective, the average variance of state ROE is about 3 percent over our 
sample period. 
  To quantify the relationships in figures 4a and 4b, we perform a variance 
decomposition of the VAR in equation (6).
10  The results of this decomposition are in 
Tables 4a and 4b.  Evidently, the state shock accounts for approximately 8 percent of the 
explained variation in the state ROA variance over the 12 quarter horizon, with own 
variance explaining the remainder.  As before, the results are similar for ROE.  The state 
shock accounts for about 10 percent of the explained variation in state ROE variance 
consistently over the 12 period horizon. 
   We also consider the effects of state shocks on the idiosyncratic variance of bank 
performance in a market using the VAR framework. By replacing var(Rjt) in the vector Yt 
(equation 6) with var(ηjt) from equation (5), we can re-estimate the VAR and simulate the 
response of the variance of bank-specific risk in a market to a shock to economic 
conditions.
11  The impulse responses are much smaller, and are generally insignificantly 
different from zero, after the initial period.  However, the impulse responses after 
controlling for regional effects suggest that the changing nature of the shocks themselves 
have some impact on the distribution of bank performance in a state.  To the extent that 
                                                 
10 We use the Cholesky decomposition in this exercise. 
11 To be precise, var(ηjt) is computed by estimating ηijt for the balanced panel (equation 4), and taking the 
cross-sectional variance of ηit for all banks in market j.  The time-series var(ηjt) for each market j is then 
inserted into the VAR in equation 6.    16
shocks differ in a particular market and over time, some of the variation at a particular 
point in time will be embedded in our residuals from the estimation of equation (4) for 
banks in the panel. 
 
Time series variance for individual banks 
The evidence so far indicates that regional shocks had statistically significant 
effects on the performance of about one-half the community banks in our sample.  
Moreover, the effects of state shocks are evident in the distribution of the performance of 
community banks.  In the next steps we consider the extent to which taking into account 
differences in the sensitivity of individual banks reduces the measured variation in their 
rates of return over time.  In particular, we compare the distribution of the adjusted R
2 
statistics from the two models of rates of returns for individual banks.  For the first set, 
R
2s were derived for each bank in the panel from regressions of ROA and ROE on 
aggregate U.S. ROA and ROE.  The second set of R
2s is from the estimates of equation 4, 
which includes both the national and state-specific component of rates of return.   
The distributions of the R
2s are shown in figures 5a and 5b.  For the U.S. market factor-
only model of ROA, the mean R
2-adjusted statistic for the 5,255 bank-regressions is 12%.  
Including the state shocks as explanatory variables raises the mean R
2 to 22%.  For the 
ROE regressions, the comparable statistics are a mean R
2s of 10% for the U.S. market-
factor only model and a mean R
2s of 21% when the state shocks are included. 
Kolmogorov-Smirnov tests for equality between the distributions in 5a and 5b easily 
reject the null hypothesis that the pairs of distributions are equal (in each case, with p-
value 0.0).  Also of note is the prominent skew to the distributions.  For some banks, 
adding state effects goes a long way towards accounting for the variation of its 
performance over time.
12 
                                                 
12 Moreover, the analysis only captures systematic effects.  The degree of the systematic relationship can 
depend on the extent and type of specialization of a bank and the nature of the economic shocks.  For 
example, a state’s shocks might hit different economic sectors—commercial real estate, aerospace, IT, 
subprime residential real estate loans—at different points in time.  In that case, the performance of a 
community bank with a diversified loan portfolio might exhibit a high degree of systematic exposure to 
state shocks.  In contrast, a highly specialized bank likely would exhibit a low degree of systematic 
exposure, even though the bank would be affected by economic conditions in its own sector of 
specialization.  Those effects would be measured as idiosyncratic effects.   17
Comparison without controlling for individual bank responses. 
The analysis above allows for individual bank responses to aggregate U.S. and 
state-specific components of rates of return.  To provide a comparison to approaches in 
which responses to shocks are constrained, we estimated a counterpart to equation (4) by 
pooling the data for the balanced panel and estimating the average effects of the national 





12 , 3 0.0001 1.04 0.28 0.08 0.11 0.07     0.02 ijt Bt jt jt jt j t RR R εε ε ε −− − =− + + + + + =  
                                     (0.038)    (0.054)   (0.028)   (0.023)      (0.028)                ROA 
 
The results from the ROE regression yield: 
  
(6)       
2
12 , 3 0.006 1.17 0.17 0.21 0.13 0.17     0.02 ijt Bt jt jt jt j t RR R εε ε ε −− − =− + + + + + =  
                                  (0.113)    (0.076)    (0.041)     (0.032)      (0.047)               ROE 
 
The coefficients from both regressions are all statistically significant.
13  For the 
state-specific effects, the sum of the coefficients is not far from the mean value taken 
from the distributions in figures 3a and 3b.  However, for this measure of the state-
specific shock, jt ε , regional conditions do not explain much of average bank performance 
when the bank responses are constrained to be the same for all banks.  This is in sharp 
contrast to the earlier results where we allow heterogeneity in the responses to the 
national and state effects.   
 
Conclusion 
The connection between regional economic conditions and the performance of 
community banks is far from straightforward.  From our analysis, regional economic 
shocks have had statistically significant effects on community banks in the sample.  
However, the magnitudes and even the direction of effects vary widely.  Also, state 
shocks tend to increase the variation in the performance of community banks. This 
                                                                                                                                                 
   18
finding is additional evidence of regional effects on bank performance.  It also is relevant 
to most studies assessing the average responses to economic shocks since the increase in 
variance would tend to reduce the precision of the estimated coefficients.  This is 
illustrated by the comparison of the results from the bank-by-bank analysis, which allow 
for heterogeneous responses to state-specific shocks, and the pooled cross-section time 
series analysis, in which responses of individual banks’ rates of return to the state effects 
are constrain to be the same for all banks.   
These results suggest that community banks are exposed to greater regional risk 
than suggested by previous studies.  At the same time, the analysis points to the difficulty 
of drawing inferences about the implications of regional economic shocks for individual 
community banks.  There is the wide range of systematic responses of community.  The 
systematic responses reflect the interaction of individual bank strategies and the makeup 
of the combination of shocks in a given state over the sample period.  In addition, the 
performance of most community banks still appears to be related in large part to bank-
specific factors.  This suggests that, even accounting for a bank’s specific exposure to 
systematic risk (national and regional effects), its risk management and general business 
practices, as well as its customer base, likely will be very important in accounting for the 
variability of its performance over time. 
                                                                                                                                                 
13 Robust standard errors are reported in parentheses.   19
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Table 1a: Distribution of Small Banks in United States
State Mean Min Max Std. Dev State Mean Min Max Std. Dev
AL 190.5 140 268 36.6 MT 119.5 74 168 36.6
AK 6.5 4 15 3.3 NE 346.8 246 450 61.5
AZ 33.4 23 48 6.6 NV 16.3 11 25 3.9
AR 226.4 152 257 36.4 NH 29.2 10 62 17.7
CA 316.8 189 412 75.3 NJ 78.4 54 117 18.1
CO 285.2 148 429 107.7 NM 69.7 44 93 18.2
CT 37.2 20 63 13.5 NY 113.7 88 152 18.7
DE 18.5 10 27 4.6 NC 58.6 44 70 6.5
DC 9.5 3 16 4.1 ND 135.1 96 177 27.0
FL 297.5 206 388 60.6 OH 233.4 157 318 45.3
GA 351.9 298 398 30.4 OK 369.3 256 521 85.3
HI 4.4 1 8 2.7 OR 43.0 27 72 10.8
ID 17.9 13 24 3.0 PA 223.2 138 313 53.3
IL 915.0 604 1226 218.1 RI 5.5 1 12 3.2
IN 233.4 122 380 85.2 SC 71.4 64 79 3.8
IA 506.8 390 627 76.5 SD 110.1 78 142 18.4
KS 473.5 343 614 95.9 TN 228.9 177 300 34.7
KY 279.3 203 330 44.5 TX 1075.2 604 1876 416.3
LA 195.8 129 290 52.8 UT 34.6 26 56 8.5
ME 17.1 13 26 3.7 VT 20.3 12 27 4.5
MD 78.0 51 96 10.1 VA 148.4 110 178 17.6
MA 55.4 22 121 28.7 WA 79.7 68 94 7.0
MI 214.1 139 358 72.3 WV 136.4 61 224 57.7
MN 568.0 447 733 94.2 WI 413.0 263 596 108.7
MS 110.5 85 158 18.8 WY 65.6 40 112 24.7
MO 472.3 329 705 112.4
*Data from the Reports of Condition.  Small banks are defined to have assets less than $1 billion.  
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Table 1b: Evolution of Banking Sector by State
State 1984.Q1 2004.Q4 State 1984.Q1 2004.Q4
AL 268 144 MT 165 76
AK 13 4 NE 448 246
AZ 35 39 NV 11 22
AR 252 156 NH 60 10
CA 383 190 NJ 117 58
CO 391 148 NM 93 45
CT 43 21 NY 152 92
DE 22 10 NC 58 59
DC 11 5 ND 176 96
FL 388 225 OH 318 157
GA 385 306 OK 506 256
HI 81 OR 72 30
ID 24 14 PA 312 141
IL 1226 604 RI 11 2
IN 380 122 SC 68 70
IA 627 390 SD 140 79
KS 608 347 TN 300 177
KY 329 203 TX 1698 604
LA 283 129 UT 56 30
ME 26 13 VT 27 12
MD 82 53 VA 178 111
MA 121 22 WA 92 69
MI 358 139 WV 224 61
MN 733 447 WI 596 263
MS 158 87 WY 112 40
MO 705 329  
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Table 2a: Regressions of State ROA on Aggregate ROA





State δ t (δ) R
2 State δ t (δ) R
2
AL 0.22 3.45 12.7% MT 2.05 14.99 73.3%
AK 2.00 6.72 35.5% NE 0.94 9.37 51.7%
AZ 4.26 13.50 69.0% NV 1.37 6.71 35.5%
AR 0.73 9.75 53.7% NH 1.25 3.10 10.5%
CA 0.72 4.56 20.2% NJ 0.48 3.10 10.5%
CO 2.40 27.89 90.5% NM 1.71 21.09 84.4%
CT 1.07 3.40 12.4% NY 0.06 0.74 0.7%
DE 1.22 4.27 18.2% NC 0.22 2.55 7.3%
DC 1.66 4.89 22.6% ND 1.14 14.69 72.5%
FL 0.65 10.04 55.2% OH 0.52 10.71 58.3%
GA 0.33 3.67 14.1% OK 1.92 17.22 78.3%
HI -0.48 -2.74 8.4% OR 1.91 13.96 70.4%
ID 1.54 7.87 43.0% PA 0.26 4.56 20.3%
IL 0.26 6.80 36.1% RI 0.21 0.44 0.2%
IN 0.61 11.90 63.3% SC 0.56 6.59 34.6%
IA 1.12 10.04 55.1% SD 0.95 7.93 43.4%
KS 0.95 16.28 76.4% TN 0.53 8.07 44.3%
KY 0.55 13.67 69.5% TX 2.44 17.79 79.4%
LA 2.56 19.26 81.9% UT 3.05 21.90 85.4%
ME 0.35 2.79 8.7% VT 0.72 3.31 11.8%
MD 0.67 9.49 52.3% VA 0.36 4.22 17.8%
MA 1.15 3.73 14.5% WA 1.09 16.97 77.8%
MI 0.50 9.73 53.6% WV 0.19 2.18 5.5%
MN 1.18 16.51 76.9% WI 0.58 12.88 66.9%
MS 0.85 13.12 67.7% WY 2.44 14.01 70.5%
MO 0.77 21.86 85.3%
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Table 2b: Regressions of State ROE on Aggregate ROE





State δ t (δ) R
2 State δ t (δ) R
2
AL 0.25 2.53 7.2% MT 2.52 10.35 56.6%
AK 4.40 4.67 21.0% NE 1.01 6.50 34.0%
AZ 6.84 8.80 48.6% NV 1.53 3.82 15.1%
AR 0.69 5.85 29.5% NH 1.57 1.84 4.0%
CA 0.13 0.51 0.3% NJ -0.17 -0.57 0.4%
CO 3.66 19.19 81.8% NM 2.01 12.11 64.1%
CT 1.31 2.25 5.8% NY -0.30 -1.79 3.7%
DE 0.78 2.14 5.3% NC 0.16 1.05 1.3%
DC 2.14 3.82 15.1% ND 1.35 10.37 56.8%
FL 0.58 4.26 18.1% OH 0.36 4.05 16.7%
GA 0.24 1.46 2.5% OK 2.35 11.79 62.9%
HI -1.03 -2.86 9.1% OR 1.77 7.41 40.1%
ID 1.18 3.07 10.3% PA -0.11 -1.15 1.6%
IL -0.07 -0.96 1.1% RI 1.01 1.50 2.7%
IN 0.50 5.98 30.4% SC 0.47 3.43 12.5%
IA 1.16 6.49 33.9% SD 0.77 4.48 19.6%
KS 0.74 7.81 42.7% TN 0.37 3.06 10.2%
KY 0.60 10.99 59.5% TX 3.51 13.33 68.4%
LA 3.45 14.27 71.3% UT 3.25 13.89 70.2%
ME -0.45 -1.85 4.0% VT 0.31 0.78 0.7%
MD 0.51 4.83 22.1% VA 0.18 1.26 1.9%
MA 1.07 1.58 3.0% WA 0.96 8.40 46.2%
MI -0.03 -0.26 0.1% WV 0.12 0.96 1.1%
MN 1.04 9.05 50.0% WI 0.38 5.96 30.3%
MS 0.73 6.73 35.6% WY 3.10 9.25 51.1%
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**significant at the 1 percent level 
# 47 states, excluding Alaska, Hawaii, and Rode Island. 
## Sum of lags t = (0, -1, -2, -3) 







Table 3a: Pooled Time Series regression of variance of ROA of 
banks in a state on the shock to the distribution to bank ROA# 









Absolute value of state 
shock
##  ∑ (abs(εjt)) 
Without controls With controls   
(state & time) 
Without controls With controls 
(state & time) 
R
2   
N  3948 
   1.266e-4                5.18e-5              8.866e-5            6.04e-5 
  (3.18e-6)**           (1.42e-5)**        (3.53e-6)**        (1.53e-5)** 
 
                                                                        
     1.69                    1.177 
     (0.365)**           (0.241)** 
                                     
                                                           0.032                2.026e-2   
                                                          (0.002)**        (2.647e-3)**     
  0.115                 0.532                     0.165                 0.527   25
** significant at the 1 percent level 
* significant at the 5 percent level 
# 47 states, excluding Alaska, Hawaii, and Rode Island. 
## Sum of lags t = (0, -1, -2, -3) 
robust standard errors in parentheses 
 
 
Table 3b: Pooled Time Series regression of variance of ROE of 
banks in a state on the shock to the distribution to bank ROE# 








Absolute value of state 
shock##  ∑ (abs(εjt)) 
Without controls With controls   
(state & time) 
Without controls With controls 
(state & time) 
R
2 
N  3948 
   0.024                5.64e-3              5.97e-03               -0.020 
  (0.001)**     (4.67e-3)           (2.28E-03)*           (0.007)*  
 
                                                                        
   3.456                2.898 
  (0.346)**          (0.299)** 
 
                                                        1.129                     0.942.   
                                                       (0.131)**              (0.156)**       
  0.15               0.412                    0.172                    0.399   26
Table 4a: Variance Decompositions for Variance of State ROA
 Period var(ROAj)a b s ( ⎠j)v a r ( R O A j)( ⎠j)
2
1 93.6 6.4 93.7 6.3
2 91.5 8.5 92.0 8.0
3 91.4 8.6 92.1 7.9
4 91.4 8.6 92.1 7.9
5 92.0 8.0 93.0 7.0
6 91.4 8.6 92.7 7.3
7 91.4 8.6 92.8 7.2
8 91.4 8.6 92.8 7.2
9 91.5 8.5 93.1 6.9
10 91.4 8.6 93.0 7.0
11 91.4 8.6 93.1 6.9
12 91.4 8.6 93.1 6.9
(based on vector autoregression using variance of state ROA and state shock--4 lags)
Table 4b: Variance Decompositions for Variance of States' ROE
 Period var(ROEj)a b s ( ⎠j) var(ROEj)( ⎠j)
2
1 92.6 7.4 91.9 8.1
2 90.1 9.9 90.4 9.6
3 89.5 10.5 89.8 10.2
4 89.1 10.9 89.6 10.4
5 90.1 9.9 91.3 8.7
6 89.6 10.4 91.2 8.8
7 89.4 10.6 91.3 8.7
8 89.3 10.7 91.3 8.7
9 89.5 10.5 91.6 8.4
10 89.3 10.7 91.7 8.3
11 89.3 10.7 91.7 8.3
12 89.3 10.7 91.7 8.3
(based on vector autoregression using variance of state ROE and state shock--4 lags)  
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Figure 1a
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Figure 2a












Plot of residuals from ROAjt = αj + δjROABt + εjt where ROABt 
is aggregate ROA for banks with assets of less than $1 billion    
 
Figure 2b













Plot of residuals from ROEjt = αj + δjROEBt + εjt where ROEBt 
is aggregate ROE for banks with assets of less than $1 billion
 
 













 Distributions of Responses of Individual Community 
Banks' ROA to National and State Components
Density















 Distributions of Responses of Individual Community Banks' 
ROE to National and State Components
Density
Model is ROEijt = αi + βiROEBt + θ1iεjt + θ2iεjt-1 + θ3iεjt-2 + θ4iεjt-3 + ηit
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Figure 4a




























   31
Figure 5a
Kernel Densities of R
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Market factor only model is ROAijt = αi + βiROABt







Kernel Densities of R











0 . 00 . 10 . 20 . 30 . 50 . 60 . 7
Density
Market factor only model is ROEijt = αi + βiROEBt
Full model is ROEijt = αi + βiROEBt + θ1iεjt + θ2iεjt-1 + θ3iεjt-2 + θ4iεjt-3
Market factor only
Full model
 